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The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1992 with 
the mission of bringing together at the Institute for  a given academic year a 
group of experts, under the supervision of annual scientific director(s), for 
researching a specific topic primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary 
nature. 
 
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 2000-2001 European 
Forum programme on “Between Europe and the Nation State: the Reshaping of 
Interests, Identities and Political Representation” directed by Professors Stefano 
Bartolini (EUI, SPS Department), Thomas Risse (EUI, RSC/SPS Joint Chair) 
and Bo Stråth (EUI, RSC/HEC Joint Chair). 
 
The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, studying the 
extent to which  Europeanisation shapes the adaptation patterns, power 
redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The categories of 
‘interest’ and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a particular 
emphasis is given to the formation of new social identities, the redefinition of 
corporate interests, and the domestic changes in the forms of political 
representation.  
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An emerging focus of European Union studies concerns the impact of European 
integration on domestic policies and institutions.  Among others, Simon Hix and 
Klaus Goetz suggest this debate is overdue, its emergence retarded by the long 
immersion of EU scholarship  in efforts to explain the dynamics of the 
integration process.
1  Domestic politics have long served as an explanatory 
factor in accounts of the integration process, but only recently have themselves 
been viewed as a dependent variable.
2  Efforts to assess the relationship between 
the construction of Europe and domestic political change in the states and 
societies that comprise the European Union are in their infancy.  As Markus 
Haverland notes, “the shaping forces and dynamics of national adaptation to 
European legislation are still poorly understood.”
3  
 
In a sense, the study of Europeanization  – the impact of European 
integration on national political economies  – constitutes a microcosm of the 
broader debate over globalization and its domestic impact.
4  A crucial difference 
– and one that makes European integration a productive “laboratory” for 
studying the impact of external forces for domestic political change – is that the 
forces promoting domestic adaptation appear to be much more direct and 
“concentrated” in the EU.  This is so for two reasons.  First, for the countries of 
the European Union, economic integration represents a conscious attempt to 
foster increased competition within Europe’s internal market in order to promote 
prosperity.  Second, to accomplish this, Europe’s single market process 
embodies a potent set of market-making mechanisms.  The single market, in 
short, may be conceptualized as an efficient mechanism for transmitting forces 
of economic liberalization.  
 
This essay asks how the focus of European economic integration on 
deepening competition encroaches on the ability of governments to use public 
sector resources to achieve political objectives.  EU member countries, though 
varying considerably in their institutional configurations, are politically 
regulated market economies with wide-ranging public sector activities.  Even in 
the first decade of the 21st century, the defining feature of the political 
economies of western Europe – of the “European model” of society – remains 
widespread, if varied, political regulation of the market economy.  For several 
decades, public resources have been used to achieve a range of objectives by 
West European governments, from protecting jobs (most West European 
countries) to securing ties between government ministries and critical segments 
of the business sector (France), to undergirding federalism (Germany), to 
fostering redistribution of economic resources across regions (Italy).  As Fritz 
Scharpf reminds us, the “market-correcting” policies pursued by West European 
governments in the postwar era have been undergirded by popular support as 
well as a belief that the ends sought through these measures represent legitimate 
policy goals of national governments.
5  Therefore constraints imposed on these 4
policies by the single market process may  “reduc(e) the capacity of national 
political systems to pursue democratically legitimized political goals.”
6  Or, to 
view this from the perspective of European institutions, as Susanne Schmidt 
does, “the Commission has the potential to seriously interfere with those parts of 
the national economies that are  not predominantly  structured by market 
principles.”
7   
   
The case study that informs this paper  – the application of European 
Community competition rules to Germany’s public sector banks – powerfully 
illustrates this point.  The case demonstrates the critical role of  European 
Community institutions in altering domestic political relationships.  It also 
reveals the significance of resulting constraints on the ability of governments to 
pursue policy objectives through the public sector.  Germany’s system of public 
law banks represent a core element of Germany’s federal structure as well as a 
central component of the social market economy.  The state Landesbanken and 
local Sparkassen are charged with a series of public service functions, including 
regional economic development and support for small and medium enterprises – 
Germany’s vital  Mittelstand.  As a consequence, the public sector banks have 
developed tight political links with local and state level political party 
organizations.  The public law financial institutions came under the scrutiny of 
the European Commission beginning in the early 1990s when Germany’s private 
sector banks raised questions about the impact on competition of the special 
financial support accorded the public law banks by the state and municipal 
governments that own them.  By the second half of 2001, this process had 
prompted fundamental reform of the public law banking system marked by 
sharp erosion of the financial privileges from which they had benefited for more 
than a half century.  Only the extension of European Community competition 
law to the public sector made this change possible.  Attesting to the significance 
of the European Commission’s role in the reform of the Landesbanken and 
Sparkassen in the face of powerful domestic political opposition, one 
representative of Germany’s commercial banking federation asserted that 
“without Brussels, we would have achieved nothing here in Germany.”
8  
   
The case raises two critical questions.  First, why does this transformation 
of Germany’s public law banks matter?  And second, what does the case reveal 
more generally about the mechanisms underlying “Europeanization,” the 
process by which European integration affects national political economies?  
 
First of all, the impact is potentially dramatic for German federalism, the 
social market economy, and Germany’s overall economic performance.  The 
German federation of public savings banks (DSGV) has warned that the 
European Commission’s application of Community competition rules to the 
public law banks in effect establishes minimal capital return requirements – and 5
not only for public sector banks, but for public law institutions generally.  This 
endangers the provision of public services by shifting the focus of these 
institutions toward profit maximization.  Dramatizing the perceived threat to the 
public sector posed by the progressive extension of competition law to 
additional sectors by the European Commission, Germany’s largest public law 
bank warns that “the Commission puts in jeopardy the future viability of all 
public-sector enterprises throughout Europe.”
9  
   
The public law banks also make a substantial contribution to the 
constitutional obligation of the German government to equalize living 
conditions across regions.  By inhibiting the regional development functions of 
the public sector banks, the Commission’s application of Community 
competition law potentially undermines this federal principle of equality of 
economic opportunity for all regions.
10  Furthermore, public savings banks are 
the primary bankers for Germany’s  Mittelstand, and finance a large share of 
business start-ups.  To the extent that compliance with Community competition 
law diminishes the ability of the public law savings banks to perform this public 
service function, the single market imposes substantial constraints on a crucial 




  In July 1999, the European Commission ruled that Westdeutsche 
Landesbank (WestLB), the largest of Germany’s public sector banks, would 
have to return DM 1.6 billion to the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen because it had 
not paid a market rate of return on assets transferred to WestLB by the Land 
government.  WestLB promptly challenged the Commission’s decision in the 
European Courts.  Justifying its action, WestLB asserted that “It is imperative 
that the Commission’s decision be tested in the courts, given that it has far-
reaching  implications for any economic activity performed by the public 
sector.”
12   Speaking in the Bundesrat the day following the Commission’s 
decision, the Economics Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen proposed that the 
Commission’s decision could have dire implications for the entire public sector: 
“in the future every investment  – literally every investment  – by the public 
sector on behalf of public-law enterprises could be declared to be unlawful 
aid.”
13  Explaining the robust political defense of Germany’s public l aw banks 
from a theoretical perspective, Richard Deeg writes that “the historical 
coalitions supporting this model of banking remain firmly committed to it, for 
its undoing would shock the very institutional core of the German political 
economy.”
14
  Indeed, if the competition rules embedded in the single European 
market can bring about fundamental reform of such purposefully-designed, 
politically-entrenched, and staunchly-defended public sector institutions in the 
most powerful EU member state, are there any limits to the transformation of the 
public sector wrought by Europe’s single market process?  And, more generally, 6
what can the case of Germany’s public sector banks reveal about the process of 
domestic political change wrought by European integration ? 
 
Theoretical Approaches to Europeanization  
 
Two concerns are central to the emerging literature on Europeanization.  First, 
what are the mechanisms by which European integration generates the prospect 
of change?  And second, what are the mediating factors  that determine the 
contours of the outcome  – i.e., the depth and timing of domestic political 
change?  While intergovernmental bargaining may explain the decision to create 
Europe’s single market, and the autonomy of the Community’s supranational 
institutions is central to explaining the application of single market competition 
law to public services long governed by politics rather than market rules, the 
critical question that follows is this: what happens next?  What are the 
consequences when Community regulation meets domestic political structures?   
 
 
Theoretical approaches to the first question, concerning the dynamics of 
change, tend to focus on the way in which the European integration process 
alters the political opportunity structures of domestic political actors. Christoph 
Knill and Dirk Lehmkuhl cite changes in opportunity structures as the primary 
mechanism of change in areas of market-making or negative integration; the 
scope of change depends upon the extent to which European policies redistribute 
resources between domestic political actors.
15  Similarly, Thomas Risse, Maria 
Green Cowles and James Caporaso shift the literature’s lingering focus on the 
impact of European integration on the relative power of national executives to a 
broader consideration of the redistribution of power among a range of domestic 
actors.  Underscoring the conception of Europeanization as a shift in opportunity 
structures, these authors work from the assumption that domestic actors will 
seek to take advantage of the availability of additional resources provided by the 
Europeanization process or the opening of new avenues to pursuing their 
objectives.
16   
   
 Ultimately, the dimensions of domestic political change depend upon 
how effectively actors are able to exploit new opportunities.  This generates the 
second question at the core of the study of Europeanization: what factors 
mediate between European-level forces for adaptation and domestic political 
outcomes?  Clear specification of these factors is central to any theory  of 
domestic political change.  M ost studies of Europeanization emphasize the 
significance of domestic political factors as mediating variables. Risse, Cowles, 
and Caporaso, for example, identify several factors that mediate between the 
adaptational pressures of Europeanization and domestic political structures, 
including the number of domestic veto points, the ability of formal institutional 
structures to facilitate change, and domestic organizational and policy cultures.
17  7
Markus Haverland highlights the i mportance of institutional veto points, 
asserting that national systems with centralized structures (Britain, the 
Netherlands) adapt much more readily to European-level pressures than 
fragmented or decentralized polities that permit broad access to the policy 
making process (Germany).
18  As these efforts to explain the scope of domestic 
political change demonstrate, ultimately two features form the kernel of any 
theory based on a model of changing opportunities and domestic responses.  The 
first is agency  –  as Risse, Cowles and Caporaso assert, “institutions do not 
change institutions; actors do.”
19   The second feature is the articulation of 
existing structures with the demands of Europeanization  – that is, the relative 
resistance of domestic institutions to change.   
 
In developing a theoretical approach to agency and institutional responses 
to external pressures, this paper builds on two insights provided by studies of 
political change outside the European integration literature: the study of 
institutional transfer, and the study of epistemic communities.  The first insight, 
echoing the findings of Wade Jacoby’s examination of institutional transfer in 
his book,  Imitation and Politics, is that domestic political receptors facilitate 
change.  Criticizing existing approaches to the relative success of institutional 
transfer for portraying transfer either as inevitable (the literature on neo-liberal 
convergence) or impossible (due to path dependence or the embeddedness of 
institutions), Jacoby finds that successful institutional transfer requires domestic 
political agency, or the “pulling in” of institutional change by indigenous 
reformers.
20  Put differently, those pushing for change from the outside need 
domestic political allies.  One of the strengths of this approach is that it avoids 
determinism: since domestic political change is neither inevitable nor 
impossible, outcomes remain uncertain.      
   
This insight may be applied to the study of European competition policy 
and its impact on the public sector.  One of the most significant emergent 
mechanisms favoring the broadening of competition is the ability of private 
sector actors who compete with public sector activities to utilize European-level 
institutional channels  – the investigatory and enforcement powers o f the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice – to demand tighter 
application of European Community competition rules.  In essence, the 
existence of multiple institutional levels comprising the European polity, along 
with the rigor of European Community competition policy, create a political 
counterpart to the economic aspect of capital mobility.  This political mobility of 
capital derives from the ability of private sector actors to move outside regional 
or national political arenas in order  to combat government practices that 
privilege public enterprises or reserve entire sectors for public services and 
thereby exclude private competitors.  Hix and Goetz refer to this as a new 
opportunity for capital to pursue an “exit strategy.”
21  This is a  crucial 8
development because however privileged the position of business in national 
political economies, that privilege stops when it encounters the autonomous 
preferences of the state.  Political mobility gives business added leverage to 
challenge government practices that protect public sector economic activities at 
the expense of private sector competitors.    
 
Capital’s political mobility can operate as a powerful weapon in the cause 
of economic liberalization. Private sector complaints have undermined elements 
of regional policy  in Italy, overturning a public statute predating the single 
market that required that authorities purchase a fixed percentage of goods and 
services from firms headquartered in the Mezzogiorno.  The ability of private 
capital to appeal to the Community regulator, the European Commission, and 
the European Court of Justice for firm application of competition rules enlists 
private sector interests in the process of opening public sector activities to 
competition.  An opening to competition in  a  market segment previously 
monopolized by the public sector may invite in competitors who then become 
advocates for further competition.  Furthermore, capital’s political mobility can 
have critical consequences that extend to the European level.  First, a complaint 
by a competitor can turn the application of EC competition policy rules toward a 
particular public undertaking.  This may result in changes in the financial 
relationship between that undertaking and the state, or even in the institutional 
structure of the public service in question.  But the effects may go beyond the 
single country in which the public undertaking operates.  As Susanne Schmidt 
has shown, when restrictive practices in a country’s public sector monopoly 
must be relinquished because they are declared incompatible with Community 
law, the government will change its position from defense of restrictive public 
sector practices to support for sectoral liberalization across the EC.  This shift in 




Private sector advocates of fuller competition may become critical 
strategic allies of a European Commission attempting to amass the support 
required to build a coalition of governments supportive of liberalization.  
Successful efforts by private sector actors to pursue interests at the European 
level  therefore  may reinforce the liberalization agenda of the European 
Commission, or even force the hand of a Commission that acknowledges the 
political  need for gradualism and restraint in promoting competition.  The 
consequence, as Fritz Scharpf writes, is that “no area of service public is now 
beyond the challenge of European competition law.”
23  
 
But is this form of agency – the political mobility of capital – sufficient to 
explain the scope and timing of the domestic political change fostered by EC 
competition rules?  According to the political mobility of capital hypothesis, 9
domestic political change would follow the resort of capital to opportunities at 
the European level.  This, in turn, would depend on the strength of capital’s 
incentives to act at the European level.  These incentives will be high when two 
conditions are met: competitors of public sector undertakings that benefit from 
restrictive practices face tight constraints on their ability to challenge those 
practices in domestic politics; and acting at the European level has a positive 
expected net benefit, meaning that benefits clearly exceed costs.   
 
The first condition for capital to act at the European level holds especially 
in cases where financial arrangements for public services are codified in public 
or budgetary law that cannot be challenged in national courts.  This is true, for 
example, of the institutional guarantees extended by municipal and state owners 
of German public law financial institutions, an arrangement that accompanies 
their public law status.  Spain’s public broadcasting companies receive grants 
from regional government authorities pursuant to budgetary laws.  In these 
instances, private sector competitors are powerless to pursue claims in national 
courts that these provisions distort competition.  The level of constraint on 
domestic political action also will be particularly high where relations between 
national government ministries and public enterprises are especially close and 
opaque, as in the French public sector.  For private sector firms in this setting, 
complaining to the European Commission may represent their first chance to 
counterbalance the political potence of their public sector counterparts. 
 
The second condition for private sector actors to take advantage of the 
opportunity to pursue their interests at the European level will be met when 
those actors can capture private benefits rather than generating public goods.  
For example, in the case of public tendering, even a well-founded complaint 
regarding violation of Community public procurement rules generates no benefit 
to the complaining party if the contract already has been awarded and the 
recipient of t he contract already is providing the contracted good or service. 
Even where a contract award process must be reopened, the complaining party 
will perceive little likely benefit if there are a large number of  firms competing 
for the contract.  The incentive for private sector action will be far stronger in 
the case of a state subsidy in which termination or repayment of the illegal aid 
directly diminishes the ability of the public sector competitor to meet market 
needs and a small number of private sector firms compete for this share of the 
market. 
 
Where these conditions are met, we should expect private sector actors to 
articulate their interests at the European level and the elimination or reduction of 
restraints on competition to follow.  Once competitors call attention to 
impediments to competition due to restrictive public sector practices, the 
regulatory authority of the European Commission, backed by the legal authority 10
of the European Court of Justice, should drive the process of change.  The 
variance of outcomes will correspond to the variation of incentives for capital to 
act at the European level  – whether these vary cross-nationally or cross-
sectorally. 
 
Considering the question of agency leads to a second insight beyond that 
gleaned from Jacoby’s work on institutional transfer – this time drawn from the 
literature on epistemic communities.  This point, which fundamentally 
challenges the hypothesis that the political mobility of capital determines the 
extent of required domestic political adjustments to the single market process, is 
that policy change may depend on the relative receptiveness of actors in 
dominant institutional positions.  For epistemic communities to produce policy 
change, they need to do more than simply generate collective understandings of 
policy problems.  The experts who act as carriers of these ideas must achieve 
influence in their domestic institutional settings in order to alter perceptions of 
interests in ways consistent with the ideas of the epistemic community and its 
policy prescriptions.
24  If this finding is generalizable and can be applied to the 
study of Europeanization, it suggests that changes in perceptions or strategies 
among actors in dominant institutional or market positions may be required to 
bring about shifts  in domestic policies and institutional change.  If this 
hypothesis holds, reliance on EC institutions by competitors would simply 
represent the initial phase of a process requiring support from those public sector 
actors entrenched in dominant institutional and market positions themselves.  
We would therefore expect a slower pace of change in response to European 
pressures.  Not only would outcomes be more indeterminate than implied by 
simply tracing the extent of capital’s political mobility, but we would  be 
especially likely to see variations across national settings – what Risse, Cowles 
and Caporaso refer to as “domestic adaptation with national colors.”
25  
   
Table 1 outlines the competing hypotheses about the agents of change 
generated in this section and their respective implications for the pace and scope 




DOMESTIC CHANGE AND AGENCY: 






public sector change 






Change ensues when 
competitors of protected 
public undertakings 
choose to appeal to EC 
competition rules; where 
claims of restrictive 
practices are well-founded, 
application of competition 
rules by the European 
Commission, backed by 
the ECJ, induces change in 




Varies with incentives of 
capital to take advantage 
of opportunities at 
European level faced by 
enterprises that compete 





When the European 
Commission applies 
competition rules to a 
sector (this may be the 
result of a complaint by a 
competitor, the request of 
national governments, or 
the Commission’s own 
initiative), a political 
process ensues which 
involves negotiation both 
between the Commission 
and those domestic actors 
benefitting from state 
protection and within 
domestic politics.  Only 
when critical domestic 
actors have revised their 
strategies or interests 
subject to new constraints 
will domestic reform take 
place.  
 
Indeterminate.  This 
depends on the political 
process that occurs among 
those actors – public sector 
monopolists and their 
political supporters – 
whose positions of market 
or institutional dominance 
are threatened by the 




The conflict that erupted in the early 1990s between Germany's system of public 
law financial institutions and Europe's single market process provides fertile 
territory for studying how Community competition rules foster change in the 12
public sector of domestic political economies. The dispute brought the 
institutional apparatus of the EC into confrontation with elements of German 
federalism and the social market economy.  From the perspective of their 
proponents, the  public sector banks represented the type of innovative 
institutional solution to the deficits of the market characteristic of the social 
market economy, insuring the provision of critical public services without 
undermining  – and arguably enhancing – competition in the sector.  Moreover, 
the close ties with local and regional party organizations enjoyed by the public 
law banks ensured their support across the political spectrum and safeguarded 
their legitimacy.  In essence, the public law banks were thoroughly insulated 
from any genuine domestic political challenge; only the progressive extension of 
Community competition rules to the public sector and the existence of European 
Community institutions armed with significant enforcement powers in the realm 
of competition policy made a challenge to these structures possible. 
 
Reflecting the enhanced political mobility of capital resulting from 
European economic integration, this challenge emerged from Germany's 
commercial banks, which saw in Community competition policy an opportunity 
to attack the privileges accruing to their competitors in the public sector by 
virtue of their public law status.  Failing at the federal level to make their case 
that the public law financial institutions enjoy unfair advantages that distort 
competition, the commercial banking federation took its claims outside 
Germany's domestic arena, to the European Commission.  In response, the 
European Commission had by the mid-1990s staked out a position that 
identified arrangements governing the public law segment of Germany's banking 
system as a violation of Community competition law.  But did this mark the end 
of the process of domestic political change, or just the beginning? 
 
 
The Public Law Banks: Public Services and Political Support 
 
Characteristic of the German system of organized capitalism, the German 
banking sector incorporates a functional division of labor between different 
types of financial institutions.  The banking system is comprised of three 
“pillars”  – the profit-minded commercial banks, member-oriented cooperative 
banks, and a network of public law banks. The public law network includes a 
system of state banks (Landesbanken) as well as local savings banks 
(Sparkassen).  Several factors have fostered deep institutionalization  of the 
public law banks.  First, within the three pillar structure of the German banking 
system, the different types of financial institutions have throughout much of the 
history of the Federal Republic engaged in activities that complement one 
another.  F or example, by providing banking services to Land and local 
governments and financing local and regional economic development, the public 13
law banks lend stability and dynamism to the entire banking environment.  
Second, the public sector banks can claim a high degree of historical continuity 
for the public service functions they perform, dating back to Imperial Germany.  
And finally, the close relationship between public law banks and their local and 
regional governments has fostered political support for t he Landesbanken and 
Sparkassen that is independent of political ideologies and therefore spans the 
party system.  This support reflects the degree to which the public law banks are 
a critical instrument of the policy autonomy of the Länder.26     
 
  The savings banks trace their roots to the early 19th century, when they 
emerged to fulfill functions in an industrializing economy that were not met by 
the large-scale investment activities of the private banks.  These included the 
provision of rural credit, financing for urban housing construction and small 
businesses, and banking services for lower- and middle-income households.27  
As the German banking system was reconstituted in the Federal Republic, the 
savings banks continued to perform these functions, growing in importance 
along with the sharp increase in private household savings.28  The 
Landesbanken were established to serve as clearing banks for the networks of 
Sparkassen and to provide financial services to their state governments.  The 
Landesbanken, which are owned by their state governments and regional 
savings bank associations,
29 comprise some of the largest banking institutions in 
Germany – half of the 20 largest as of the mid-1990s.30 
 
  The public law banks provide a diverse range of public services derived 
from the fundamental principles of German federalism and the social market 
economy.  These include commitments to finance and advise small and medium 
enterprises and to support local and regional economic development and cultural 
projects.  Even as i nternational capital mobility has increased, the network of 
public sector savings banks (Sparkassen) has remained attentive to the long-term 
financing needs of Germany’s  Mittelstand.31   The Sparkassen not only fund 
about half of Germany’s new business start-ups, but also provide services such 
as small business advising and collective goods like technology centers and 
regional company networks.32  The Sparkassen and Landesbanken perform 
similar services for Germany’s local governments, providing the majority o f 
municipal loans, offering investment consulting to public administrations, and, 
especially in the case of the larger Landesbanken, acquiring shares in the 
interests held by individual Länder.33  The Landesbanken also are intimately 
involved in regional economic development and restructuring.  Each of the 
German Länder pursue structural policies intended to promote selected 
economic activities, such as investment in new technologies, housing 
construction, or environmental protection.  The Landesbanken provide the 
financial services required to implement these policies. 14
  Given the role played by the savings banks and Landesbanken in state and 
local government policy implementation, it is unsurprising that the public law 
banks benefit from broad political support from state and local political leaders.  
The public law banking system is even further interwoven with political 
leadership by the presence of government officials  – from whichever parties 
govern at the regional or local level  – on the boards of their Landesbanken or 
local savings banks.
34  Government officials, typically from state finance 
ministries, often move into top positions at the Landesbanken when they leave 
government service.  In sum, the political ties of the public law banks are 
territorial  rather than partisan.  Since governing coalitions tend to be stable 
across localities and regions in Germany, but display substantial variation across 
the national territory, political support is deeply institutionalized, particularly 
across the two largest political parties, the SPD and CDU/CSU.   
 
As implementation of Europe’s single market accelerated in the early 
1990s, then, Germany's public law banking system appeared to be well insulated 
from the reach of EC competition policy.  The public law banks  were 
extensively involved in the provision of public services critical to individual 
households, small businesses, municipal and state governments, and regional 
economic development, and had deeply-rooted political support from senior 
regional and local party officials.  Moreover, while the European Commission in 
its application of Community state aid rules often had demanded the 
restructuring of entities dependent upon subsidies to keep them in operation, the 
public sector banks did not rely on state subsidies to meet their operating costs, 
but were in fact profitable, even as they provided public services.
35     
 
Mobilization of Private Sector Competitors and Germany's Public Law Banks
         
The public law status of the savings banks and Landesbanken carries important 
benefits designed to compensate these financial institutions for their public 
service obligations and to insure that they will be able to carry out these 
functions.  The three-pillar structure of the German banking sector facilitates 
public service provision within a competitive market environment.  Conflict 
between the different types of financial institution in theory is muted provided 
that the activities of the three pillars remain complementary.  However, the 
public law banks and commercial banks clearly compete with one another, and 
this competition has intensified  since the 1980s  with the liberalization of 
Europe’s financial markets.  The Landesbanken, in fact, are not only the primary 
financial institutions of their state governments and the central institutions of the 
regional savings banks, but also are universal commercial banks.  The 
Landesbanken and their Land governments view earnings from commercial 
banking activities as crucial to their financial capacity to execute their public 
service functions.  Conflict between different types of banking institutions  is 15
driven by this competition.  But the conflict that burst forth in the 1990s was not 
entirely new.  During the debate over a new banking sector law in the early 
1960s, for example, the private banks attacked the favorable regulatory and tax 
treatment of the savings banks as an unfair competitive advantage.  While the 
tax exempt status of savings banks was eliminated in the late 1960s as savings 
banks profits grew in response to the rapid rise in private household savings in 
the Federal Republic, the conflict was hardly resolved, and commercial banks 




  Even as implementation of Europe’s single market proceeded in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Germany’s Landesbanken and Sparkassen continued to 
enjoy  substantial regulatory advantages.  There were three dimensions to these 
benefits.  First, state and local governments guaranteed both the institutional 
functions  (Anstaltslast)  and the liabilities (Gewährträgerhaftung)  of their public 
law banks.  This means that Land governments were committed to providing 
their public sector banks with the resources necessary to fulfill all of their 
functions.  The full  guarantee of bank liabilities meant that both depositors and 
creditors could be certain that their funds were protected.
37  As a direct 
consequence of these guarantees, the public sector banks obtained higher credit 
ratings.  This, in turn, lowered their  borrowing costs.
38
  Indeed, in 2000 there 
were 22 public sector credit institutions that garnered a “Triple A” rating from 
credit agencies in Germany, as well as 4 in Austria.  Only 5 additional banks in 
the entire EU matched this rating.
39
     
 
  A second benefit accruing to the public sector banks also relates to their 
liability guarantee and consequent high credit ratings.  Because they did not 
have to fear the impact of investment risk on their credit ratings and costs of 
raising capital, the public sector  banks could engage in higher-risk investments 
than financial institutions in the commercial sector.  This enabled the 
Landesbanken in particular to extend their influence far beyond their regions.  
Westdeutsche Landesbank, for example, the largest of the Landesbanken, does 
more than one-third of its business abroad, and earns two-fifths of its returns 
there.
40  It is particularly strong in East Asia, an especially high-risk investment 
market.  Under its politically powerful chief executive, Friedel Neuber, WestLB 
also pursued ambitious expansion plans in London financial markets, in French 
banking and insurance, and, after 1989, in East European markets.  In short, in 
response to financial market liberalization,  the Landesbanken  beginning in the 
late 1980s  became deeply involved in corporate lending and international 
investment banking, competing directly with large commercial banks in 
Germany and other European Union countries.
41   
 16
   Finally, governments demanded far lower returns on their equity from 
public  sector banks than private shareholders expected from the commercial 
banks.  As Sinn argues, government capital invested in public sector banks 
should on economic grounds earn  higher returns than equity in private banks 
precisely because of the liability guarantee carried by that capital.  In fact, the 
public sector banks consistently provide lower returns on capital than the private 
banks.
42
  Moreover, the public law status of the Landesbanken, coupled with 
their intimate role in the implementation of Land l evel policies, makes them a 
natural destination for state resources earmarked for regional development 
functions.  This is illustrated by the 1991 decision of the state parliament of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen to integrate its Housing Promotion Agency 
(Wohnungsbauförderungsanstalt, or Wfa), which had operated as an 
independent public law institution from its founding in 1957, into the 
Westdeutsche Landesbank.  This step ultimately brought the internal German 
conflict between different types of financial institutions to the European level 
and triggered the application of European Community competition law to 
Germany’s public law banks.   
 
  The government of Nordrhein-Westfalen justified the transfer of Wfa 
assets totaling DM 5.9 billion to WestLB as a means of reducing the cost of 
administering the Land’s low-cost housing development programs.
43  According 
to the Land government, plans to achieve greater administrative efficiency in the 
housing promotion program had been under discussion since the 1970s.
44  But 
the transfer also accomplished an increase in capital needed by WestLB to 
comply with capital adequacy rules established in the 1988 Basle Convention.
45  
Indeed, five additional state governments – Lower Saxony, Berlin, Schleswig-
Holstein, Hamburg, and Bavaria – emulated the Nordrhein-Westfalen maneuver 
as a means of meeting the new capital requirements.  Transfer of the housing 
program assets was therefore an alternative to  privatization,  a new issue of 
shares by the bank (a step WestLB’s private sector competitors had to take in 
order to achieve capital adequacy), an injection of capital from the state budget 
in a time of fiscal scarcity, or a contraction of the bank’s business in order to 
restructure its risks.  But the transferred assets also exceeded the amount needed 
by WestLB for capital adequacy, and therefore permitted WestLB to expand its 
commercial activities.
46  Germany’s commercial banks, which had hoped in vain 
that the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen, Germany’s banking 
supervisory body, would not permit the public sector banks to treat the housing 
development assets as core capital, viewed this as a serious threat given the 
aggressive expansion undertaken by WestLB since the late 1980s.   
 
In response, WestLB’s private sector competitors sharpened their attack 
on the benefits accruing to the public sector banks. The Bundesverband 
deutscher Banken (BdB), Germany’s federation of commercial banks 17
(representing approximately 300 privately owned banks, including  the giants 
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank) argued with increasing vehemence that the 
privileges of the public law banks limited their growth potential in the domestic 
German market, while public resources subsidized the far-flung investment 
banking and corporate lending activities of the Landesbanken abroad.  Lodging 
a complaint with the European Commission in 1993, the commercial banks 
initially sought to have the integration of the Wfa declared invalid based on the 
capital adequacy directive adopted by the European Community in the wake of 
the  Basle Accord.  However, the Commission’s internal market Directorate 
General was reluctant to overrule the approval of the measure by Germany’s 
federal banking supervisory authority.  The BdB then took a different approach, 
complaining to the European Commission’s competition policy DG that the 
increase in the bank’s equity capital comprised an illegal state aid that distorted 
competition in the single market because WestLB had not paid an adequate rate 
of return on the capital.
47
  The BdB sought to exploit the political opportunity 
opened by the increasingly aggressive enforcement of state aid rules from 
Brussels.  
   
Acutely aware of the intensely political nature of the issue, the 
Community’s Competition Policy Commissioner, Karel van Miert, encouraged 
Land NRW, WestLB, and the commercial banking federation to resolve the 
issue internally. Such an approach also was favored by Germany’s federal 
Finance Ministry, which wished to prevent conflict with Brussels and avoid 
tension with the Länder.  Hoping to facilitate a German solution to the problem, 
the Commission participated in 16 meetings with German federal and state 
authorities, representatives of WestLB, and of other Landesbanken between July 
1994 and June 1997.
48  However, confident that it could justify the rate of return 
paid to the Land government and in the power of its political support, WestLB 
was not willing to offer enough of an increase in its return to the state to satisfy 
the BdB.
49   After several rounds of discussion facilitated by the federal 
government and including the Bundesverband Oeffentlicher Banken (VÖB), the 
association of public sector banks, the BdB announced that it was no longer 
prepared to participate in talks at the national level, and that it would pursue the 
issue exclusively in Brussels.
50
    
   
In January 1997, the Commission’s competition DG informed the 
Landesbanken and commercial banks of its intention to open a formal 
investigation of the Wfa case. The VÖB, whose chairman, Friedel Neuber, also 
served as chairman of the WestLB, argued that in pursuing their complaint, the 
commercial banks were simply reacting to the growing market presence of the 
public sector banks.  The VÖB joined the smaller DSGV, the Federation of 
German Savings and Giro Banks, in a threat to withdraw support for European 18
monetary union.
51
  However, the threat was counterproductive and opened the 
first cracks in the political defense of the public law banks.  The position came 
under widespread attack in the German press.  The FDP parliamentary party 
labeled the effort “attempted blackmail,” calling it “a typical example of the 
inclination of the public law sector to block competition.”  The FDP declared 
that “ The interests of the public law banks cannot be placed before that of 
Germany’s competitive position and before the goal of European integration.”
52  
Germany’s commercial banks, on the other hand, now hoped that the 
Westdeutsche Landesbank case would draw the European Commission’s 
attention beyond the matter of the state housing development funds to the much 
more significant issue of state loan guarantees extended to the Landesbanken.  
Unwilling to take on this politically sensitive issue directly, the BdB hoped the 
Commission would embark on a more far-reaching scrutiny of the German 
banking system.
53
   
 
Guarantees Under European Scrutiny 
 
At the June 1997 intergovernmental summit, the German government secured 
the agreement of other member state governments to a “Declaration of Public 
Credit Institutions” annexed to the June 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.  The statement 
acknowledged that Germany’s public credit institutions are entitled to full 
compensation for the public service functions they perform.  Some supporters of 
the public sector banks believed they had built a fire wall against any possible 
Commission intervention on competition policy grouds.  In a press release, the 
DSGV presented its interpretation of the declaration, asserting that “The 
European Commission acknowledges that the member states have the right to 
self-determination in the structuring of their financial infrastructure.”  From the 
perspective of the savings bank federation, the declaration confirmed that “the 
organizational form and activities of the Sparkassen and Landesbanken are fully 
compatible with European Community competition rules.”
54
      
 
  Why wasn’t this declaration, accepted by the national governments of all 
EU member states, sufficient to protect the public law banks against the reach of 
Community competition policy?  The declaration was in fact an egregious defeat 
for the public sector banks and for the German Länder.  In seeking an 
intergovernmental agreement to protect Germany’s unique public law banks, the 
German federal government was acting at the insistence of the Länder.  Concern 
among the Land governments about the application of Community state aid 
rules to the public law banks was heightened by the European Commission’s 
January 1997 decision to open a formal investigation into the transfer of housing 
development resources to WestLB.  In February 1997, the Land government of 
Schleswig-Holstein, occupying the rotating Bundesrat presidency, introduced a 19
draft resolution concerning the broader question of state guarantees.  The 
resolution called upon the federal government to seek agreement in the 
intergovernmental conference to a protocol to Article 222 of the EC Treaty 
(which commits the Community to neutrality regarding public vs. private 
ownership)  which would declare that state aid rules do not apply to the 
institutional and liability guarantees of the public law banks.
55  The resolution 
was adopted unanimously by the Bundesrat.  In short, the Länder sought to 
preempt any threat to the status of the Landesbanken and Sparkassen by 
explicitly excluding them from Community competition rules.  The resolution 
sought legitimacy by basing its defense of the public law banks on the need to 
preserve the diversity of governing structures and forms of public sector 
enterprise throughout the EU.  The Kohl government had been reluctant to take 
up this initiative because of its broader support for the Community state aid 
regime and its fear of losing political credibility within Europe in the area of 
competition policy.
56  But Chancellor Kohl came under severe pressure from the 
Minister-Presidents of several Länder to pursue the idea of writing protection of 
the public law banks into the Treaty revision.     
 
  The protocol sought by the Länder would have had legal force.  However, 
the German government was unable to obtain support for such a measure in the 
European Council.
57  The declaration obtained by the German government, 
which is not attached to a Treaty article and has no legal significance, simply 
states that compensation should be strictly limited to that required by public 
service duties.
58
  Moreover, the declaration refers to the Commission’s view that 
Community competition rules permit compensation for services of general 
economic interest performed by Germany’s public law credit institutions.  The 
statement therefore left open the question of the admissability of state 
guarantees of bank liabilities. Ultimately the German government’s effort to 
secure protection of the public law banks was important by virtue of its perverse 
consequence: it publicized the guarantees behind the Sparkassen and 
Landesbanken, until then a feature of the social market economy little-known 
outside Germany, and made the system a focus of scrutiny at the European level.  
Representatives of the German government and of individual Länder describe 
this as a case of the German government having “shot itself in the foot.”
59  
   
After the Amsterdam declaration, there remained opposition to the 
benefits granted to the Landesbanken from other member state governments and 
from the European Commission, which expressed concern about the ability of 
the large Landesbanken to use state guarantees of their liabilities to obtain more 
favorable credit ratings.60  Competition Commissioner Karel van Miert had 
expressed the view as early as 1996 that the system of guarantees was 
inconsistent with EC competition policy.  The Commission h ad come under 20
heavy political pressure from the German government not to pursue this issue, 
and again called upon the Landesbanken, Länder, commercial banks, and federal 
government to resolve the matter internally.  In order to intensify the pressure 
for a  German resolution to the guarantees problem, the Commission in 
November 1998 presented before the Council of member state Economics and 
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) its report on public service provision in the 
banking sector, which indicated that the guarantees represented illegal state 
aid.61 
   
The report was designed to address the claim that the Landesbanken and 
Sparkassen were exempt from Community state aid rules by virtue of their 
provision of services of general economic interest – in other words, according to 
Treaty article 90(2).  In the report the Commission challenged the justification 
for the guarantees provided to the public law banks on three fundamental 
grounds.  First, simply providing a national financial services network across all 
regions d oes not by itself constitute a service of general economic interest.  
Where a service offered can be provided by a market actor, any compensation 
provided by the government violates EC competition rules.  The report 
contrasted the German public law banking system with that in Sweden, where a 
public credit institution set up under the auspices of the postal service is required 
to serve sparsely-populated areas not served by any other credit institution, and 
is justly compensated for performing that public service function.  As for 
financial services for regional and local economic development, the Commission 
asserted that these must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  Were the states 
and municipalities to allow all financial institutions to offer these services on a 
fee basis, some would in fact be offered by profit-motivated commercial banks.  
Moreover, in cases where state assistance is provided to institutions set up for 
exclusively public functions, such as raising capital for state governments, 
government support “may not spill over in any way into competitive activities of 
the institution.”62  Compensation for public service functions, that is, can not 
cross-subsidize commercial activities.  
   
The Commission’s report also purposefully noted that state aid to savings 
banks with purely local impact does not come under state aid rules when the 
activites of local banks do not affect trade between member states.  This point 
signalled that the dispute over state guarantees could be resolved with minimal 
disruption to the small and medium Sparkassen.  But the defense of the public 
law banks from German political leaders repeatedly underscored the unity of the 
system.  It was only two years later, in the context of discussions over reform of 
the public law banks, that the local Sparkassen began to perceive a clear 
difference of interests from the Landesbanken. 
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The WestLB Ruling 
 
By mid-1998, the European Commission in the course of its formal investigation 
of the Wfa transfer to WestLB had received comments from  two additional 
national banking associations – the French and the British – in support of the 
BdB complaint.  The Association Francaise des Banques pointed specifically to 
the boost given by the asset transfer to WestLB’s presence in France’s municipal 
finance sector.
63  Meanwhile,  the European Commission staked out a clear 
position on the issue of state guarantees, indicating that those provided to the 
Landesbanken violated EC competition rules.  Significant support for the 
Commission’s position emerged among EU member state governments; at the 
November 1998 ECOFIN Council, the German government was isolated in its 
opposition to the Commission’s report.64  But the Sparkassen and Landesbanken 
were able to draw on extensive cross-party political support in the early stages 
of the controversy.  
 
  Despite high-level political opposition, the European Commission in July 
1999 ruled that WestLB would have to repay nearly DM 1.6 billion ($868 
million) of aid to the Land of North Rhine Westphalia.  The Commission 
reasoned that a market investor would have demanded a higher rate of return 
than that received by the Land government for the housing development funds 
transferred to West LB.  The kernel of the Commission’s position was that while 
member states are free to use public assets to achieve policy objectives, market 
economy rules apply once those assets are used for commercial activities.  As 
phrased in the Commission’s decision, “as soon as the State decides to assign 
public-purpose assets to a commercial use, it should seek a remuneration 
corresponding to market terms.”
65  According to the Commission’s assessment, 
the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen did not seek such compensation in the case of 
the Wfa asset transfer; the repayment demanded reflects the difference between 
a market rate of return and that paid by WestLB, plus interest.66   
 
  The Commission’s decision had significance far beyond the immediate 
case of the transfer of capital to WestLB in 1992. Within months after the new 
Commission assumed office in May 1999, the competition directorate under 
Commissioner Mario Monti began investigating cases involving similar 
infusions of capital into six additional Landesbanken.67  Germany's Federation 
of Public Banks (VÖB) reacted with outrage, asserting that the Commission’s 
objective was to alter Germany’s institutional structures and system of property 
ownership.68  The VÖB insisted that since the banking structure is a core part of 
the social market economy, and essential to funding local and regional 
development, it lies outside the jurisdiction of the European Commission.  
Referring to principles of subsidiarity and a “Europe of the regions,” the VÖB 
called upon the European Parliament and the German Bundestag to impose 22
tighter controls on the activities of the European  Commission.  Arguing along 
similar lines, and reflecting an unusual cross-party political alliance with the 
CSU’s Edmund Stoiber, Bavarian premier, Henning Scherf, SPD leader of the 
Bremen government, called the progress of European integration a danger for 
federalism.
69  And in defiance of Brussels, the Bundesrat on the day following 
release of the Commission’s decision in the WestLB case passed a resolution 
defending Germany’s public sector banking system.
70    
 
  WestLB and the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen  adopted a two-track 
response to the Commission’s decision.  First, both WestLB and Nordrhein-
Westfalen challenged the decision in the European Court.  However, since a 
legal challenge does not have a suspensive effect according to EC law, WestLB 
was required  to comply with the Commission's decision unless and until it is 
anulled by the courts.  Accordingly, the government of Nordrhein-Westfalen 
offered to take a larger equity stake in WestLB in lieu of a cash repayment of the 
aid.  The Commission ruled out  this approach, asserting that it would not 
compensate for the advantages accruing to the Landesbank from the use of state 
funds.71    Germany’s federal government also filed a complaint against the 
European Commission in the ECJ.  Given the SPD/Green coalition’s reliance on 
the opposition-controlled Bundesrat to endorse its program of tax and pension 
reforms, and the fact that the threat to the Landesbanken and Sparkassen 
affected every Land government, the federal government had little choice but to 
support the legal action of Nordrhein-Westfalen and WestLB. 
 
The public sector banks remained determined to use their political 
leverage to force the Commission to back down.  Several political leaders at the 
state level threatened in the year immediately following the decision on the 
WestLB case to use their power in the German Bundesrat to block any proposed 
institutional reforms designed to prepare the EU for enlargement.  Noting that 
some EU issues still require unanimous support from member state 
governments, D etlev Samland of the SPD, Nordrhein-Westfalen’s Minister for 
European Affairs, warned that “The Commission must consider very precisely if 
it really wants a legal confrontation with Germany.”72  Samland’s threat to veto 
institutional reforms was seconded by Henning Scherf, premier of Bremen, and 
Edmund Stoiber of Bavaria.73  As of early 2000, the conflict between European 
Community competition rules and central elements of German federalism and 
social market economy appeared irresolvable.  
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Resolution on German Terms?  The Koch-Weser Group 
 
Although the decision on the WestLB state aid case directly involved only a 
single Landesbank, the decisive classification of the transfer of housing 
development assets as an illegal state aid clearly affected additional 
Landesbanken.  Moreover, the emerging scrutiny of the entire system of state 
guarantees provided to all Landesbanken further indicated the need for a 
coordinated response.  At a formal level, Community state aid rules identified 
the federal government as the partner of the European Commission responsible 
for implementation of a state aid decision.  In the months following the WestLB 
decision, the Minister-Presidents of the Länder called upon the federal 
government to coordinate negotiations over a solution to the problems faced by 
the Landesbanken.  The result was the formation in fall 1999 of the Koch-Weser 
group, an informal roundtable led by Caio Koch-Weser, State Secretary at the 
federal Finance Ministry, and including representatives of the public sector 
institutions.  The purpose of the Koch-Weser group was to facilitate discussions 
between the public law banks of measures that could resolve the conflict 
between state guarantees and EC competition rules and to carry out negotiations 
with the European Commission. 
 
  From the outset, there were critical cleavages within the Koch-Weser 
group.  One cleavage ran between the federal and Land governments.  The 
federal government accepted the legitimacy of the Commission’s involvement, 
preferred to minimize conflict with Brussels, and therefore wished to find a way 
to rapidly resolve the issue.  The Länder rejected Brussels’ authority and 
believed that Germany’s public law structures were outside the competence of 
the Commission.  Officials from the Länder hoped to negotiate a new 
understanding about the scope of Community competition law rather than 
redefining the structure of the Landesbanken, to which they hoped to make no 
more than marginal adjustments.  In spite of this divide, the federal government 
recognized that it would be very costly politically to impose its will on the 
Länder, and did not attempt to do so.  A second cleavage ran through the Länder 
themselves, a product of the different structures and levels of dependence of 
their Landesbanken on commercial activities to fund their public service 
functions; this cleavage deepened as market conditions intensified pressures, 
especially on WestLB, for decisive steps toward reform. 
 
  The Koch-Weser group considered several options for addressing the 
incompatibility of state guarantees with Community competition rules.  One 
possible resolution, supported by some CDU/CSU politicians at the federal 
level, was for the public sector banks – both Landesbanken and Sparkassen – to 
pay a market rate of interest to state governments for the capital to which they 
have access and a market rate of return on the guarantees provided to them.  The 24
CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s competition policy spokesman, Hartmut 
Schauerte, argued that such an approach would not only improve competition in 
the banking sector, but also would carry fiscal benefits for state governments 
and improve the international reputation of the German financial sector.
74
  But 
this proposed resolution of the tension between state guarantees and EC state aid 
rules ultimately proved unviable.  Since the guarantees provided to the 
Landesbanken were for an unlimited amount and duration, determining a market 
premium would prove difficult.  The potential for controversy over the amount 
paid would prolong market uncertainty; as discussed below, the value of 
certainty increased over time for WestLB and the other Landesbanken.   
 
  Splitting commercial activities from public service functions represented 
a more definitive solution.  Operationally separate, the latter would continue to 
benefit from state guarantees; the former would no longer be underwritten by the 
state.  Such a breakup of the bank’s operations might or might not be 
accompanied by privatization of the commercial unit.  Though careful to 
emphasize that it had nothing to say about the ownership structure of Germany’s 
public banks, the European Commission encouraged a comprehensive and final 
resolution of the conflict through the splitting off of private from public 
functions.  While notifying the German government officially in January 2001 
that state guarantees of the Landesbanken constituted a state aid incompatible 
with Community law, the Commission also underscored that since the system of 
public law banks predated the EC Treaty, the guarantees would be treated as 
“existing aid.”  Consequently, the Landesbanken were not liable for repayment 
of the value of past state guarantees, and the guarantees provided on any debt 
already issued would remain in place.  Despite these incentives to comply with 
Community c ompetition rules, both the Landesbanken and Land governments 
remained hesitant to fundamentally restructure the public law banking system.       
 
The Interests of the Public Sector Banks Redefined  
 
  Until fall 2000, the official position of the Koch-Weser group reflected an 
unwillingness of the Land governments to yield to the Commission.  The Länder 
continued to wage a positional war against the application of Community state 
aid rules, insisting both that the Commission’s assault on the Landesbanken was 
inconsistent with the principle of a “Europe of the regions” and that the 
guarantees did not in any case constitute state aid.  However, during the course 
of 2000, the political base undergirding the Landesbanken began to weaken.  A 
shift in perceptions of the Landesbanken and Sparkassen among German 
political elites created the necessary conditions for a resolution of the conflict. 
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  How was this possible given the deep institutionalization of 
Landesbanken and Sparkassen political support?  As state and l ocal politicians 
declared their defiance of the Commission in the months following the WestLB 
decision, no one, including Germany’s BdB, had yet lodged a formal complaint 
about the liability and institutional guarantees.  In December 1999, this changed.  
The European Commission received a formal complaint from the European 
Banking Federation (EBF) alleging that state guarantees gave a competitive 
advantage to Germany’s public sector banks within the euro-zone.
75  The 
complaint specifically named three of Germany’s public law institutions: 
Westdeutsche Landesbank, Stadtsparkasse Köln, and Westdeutsche 
Immobilienbank, but chose these institutions from different segments of the 
public law sector in order to target the entire system of guarantees. The EBF 
essentially served as a vehicle through which the BdB channeled its complaint to 
the Commission.  The Commission itself had encouraged the complaint by 
repeatedly admonishing the BdB that it would not proceed in the absence of a 
formal complaint. With the complaint in hand, the Commission could claim that 
it had no choice but to apply state aid rules to the guarantees provided to the 
public law banks.  Recent European Court cases in which third parties had won 
judgments against the Commission for failing to act on their state aid complaints 
– as in Telecinco, the Spanish public broadcasting case – lent credibility to the 
Commission’s claim.
76  And since the complaint came from the European level 
rather than directly from the BdB, it signalled that this was not simply a matter 
of Germany’s commercial banks attempting to gain competitive advantage. 
Rather, the case involved a breach of Community competition rules with 
Europe-wide implications.  
 
  The support for Germany’s private banks provided by the EBF further 
undermined the position of the Landesbanken and contributed to an erosion of 
their support from the political parties at the federal level.  Unsurprisingly, the 
FDP, freer to take up the cause of the commercial banks both because of its 
programmatic commitment  to liberalism and its lesser political stake in the fate 
of the Landesbanken and Sparkassen, was first to condemn the position of the 
public sector institutions.  But the critical blow  – to the Landesbanken in 
particular – came when the national leadership of the large parties began to view 
their position as untenable.  In July 2000, the European Affairs spokesperson for 
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, Peter Hintze, asserted that the 
Landesbanken had far overstepped their initial mission, and had become “overly 
large, internationally active investment banks.”  Hintze called for full 
privatization of the Landesbanken.  Most significantly of all, he justified the 
European Commission’s case in terms of Germany’s domestic political needs: 
“fair competition is a  central requisite of the functioning of the social market 
economy.”
77  Similarly, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s competition policy 
spokesman, Hartmut Schauerte, argued that “The time for privileges that narrow 26
competition has passed,” and that “From the perspective of competition, the 
European Commission can not decide otherwise than to prohibit these 
privileges.”
78  And Friedrich Marz, leader of the CDU/CSU Bundestag 
delegation, argued that the Federal Republic lacks an instrument of national 
subsidy control; by providing effective control of subsidies for Germany’s 
public sector banks, Brussels was filling in this gap.
79  
   
In Nordrhein-Westfalen, Christian Democrats on WestLB’s executive 
committee began to promote splitting up and partial privatization as a solution in 
2000.  Following a series of municipal election victories that gave the CDU 
control of local savings banks with seats on WestLB’s supervisory board, the 
CDU gained control of the board.  Jurgen Ruttgers, NRW’s CDU leader, in 
November 2000  announced the board’s support for breaking up and partially 
privatizing WestLB.
80  But CDU leaders were clear to distinguish the fate of the 
Landesbanken from that of the Sparkassen.
81  European Affairs spokesperson for 
the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, Peter Hintze, argued that the legitimacy of 
the regional responsibilities of the Sparkassen must be fully distinguished from 
the case of the Landesbanken, and that their role should be determined by local 
political leadership.
82  Moreover, some state level political leaders began to rally 
around the Sparkassen at the expense of the Landesbanken. Wolfgang Clement, 
Minister-President of Nordrhein-Westfalen, argued before a BdB forum that the 
European Commission must make it clear “that the German savings bank system 
– as we know it today – remains.”
83  The president of the federation representing 
the  Mittelstand (Bundesverband mittelständische Wirtschaft) endorsed this 
position, while deriding the Landesbanken for “juggling currency and shares in 
the Far East.”
84   
   
At the federal level, the governing SPD publicized its view that the 
Landesbanken could not legally defy Brussels, and tried to craft a compromise 
solution.  In a July 2000 meeting with respresentatives of the states, Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder proposed that the public credit institutions establish a barrier 
between public functions and commercial activities (with the former backed by 
state guarantees).  The reactions to this general approach did not break neatly 
along party lines; the concept of splitting Landesbank activities was rejected by 
Henning Scherf, SPD leader of the Bremen government, Edmund Stoiber 
(CSU), Minister-President of Bavaria, and Bernhard Vogel (CDU), premier of 
Thuringia.  Others, including Peter Steinbrück (SPD), Nordrhein Westfalen’s 
finance minister, and Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), premier of Lower Saxony, were 
more supportive of Schröder.  
 
As the federal/Land cleavage became more pronounced, pressure on the 
Koch-Weser group intensified.  The Commission’s decision in the WestLB case 
and i ts formal announcement that state guarantees constituted illegal state aid 27
created market uncertainty for WestLB, which began to experience a small but 
observable impact on its cost of raising capital.  This, as much as the threat of 
Commission action on t he EBF complaint, provided WestLB with a powerful 
incentive to seek a final resolution of the conflict with the Commission.
85  The 
Commission’s investigation of capital transfers to other Landesbanken had a 
similar impact, concentrating the attention of the Landesbanken on a decisive 
settlement.  In this context, discussions in the Koch-Weser group advanced.  In 
February 2001, a delegation led by Koch-Weser and Peer Steinbrück, Finance 
Minister of Nordrhein-Westfalen, proposed to the Commission a plan for 
splitting the public service and commercial operations of WestLB  – the latter 
representing about four-fifths of the bank’s assets.  The Commission raised 
several doubts about the proposal, including questions about where the line 
between the two portions of  the operation would be drawn and whether there 
might remain possibilities for the commercial segment to subsidize the public 
service portion of the business.  The WestLB plan called for a parent public 
sector institution to provide a letter of unrestricted guarantee to its commercial 
subsidiary, for which the subsidiary would not provide any remuneration.
86  But 
the Commission also expressed reservations in response to efforts of the Land 
government to protect the state’s system of Sparkassen.  The restructuring 
proposal was limited to the Landesbanken and did not address the situation of 
the Sparkassen, for which it sought to maintain preferential financing terms and 
to secure an exemption from the EC public sector transparency directive, which 
in July 2000 had been extended to cover the banking sector.
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At the same time, officials of the larger Sparkassen recognized that, with 
Sparkassen Köln mentioned specifically in the EBF complaint, the savings bank 
sector would not remain untouched by the application  of Community 
competition law.  But the Sparkassen are less dependent than the Landesbanken 
on liability guarantees because they raise capital primarily through customer 
deposits rather than through capital markets.  Therefore, rather than undergo the 
sort of scrutiny and uncertainty experience by the Landesbanken, officials of the 
large Sparkassen came to favor reforms that would remove any doubts about the 
compatibility of their activities with Community state aid regulations.  The 
smaller Sparkassen, focused exclusively on local or regional markets, still hoped 
to emerge from the conflict intact. 
 
In May 2001, the European Commission informed the German 
government that it had 2 months to accede to the requested reform of its 
gurantee scheme for public law  banks and until the end of September 2001 to 
inform the Commission about how it would accomplish this.  Germany would 
then have until March 31, 2002 to implement the specific measures agreed to 
achieve compliance.
88  The solution that emerged from the Koch-Weser group 
involved the elimination of the liability guarantee (Gewährträgerhaftung).  The 28
institutional guarantee (Anstaltslast) is provided to undertakings of the public 
law form as a matter of German law.  But according to the measures adopted to 
establish compliance between public sector banks and Community law, 
Anstaltslast would operate with the provision that if the guarantee is used, it will 
be informed to the Commission as a state aid and subject to the Commission’s 
approval according to the terms of EC competition rules.  Reflecting the varying 
perspectives of the Landesbanken, this arrangement would form the basis of a 
“platform model” around which the different Landesbanken could structure their 
own arrangements.
89    Finally, in June 2001, the German delegation to the 
European Commission abandoned the insistence on providing a guarantee to 
WestLB’s commercial division, clearing the way for a final settlement of the 
conflict between Germany’s public law banking system and EC state aid rules.  
The principal issue remaining for negotiation concerned the transition period for 
eliminating the liability guarantee.  The Bavarian state government proposed a 
period of 10 years, to the Commission’s suggested four.  But this is a matter of 
when reforms will be completed; that fundamental reform will take place, and 
that it will involve a clear separation between public services and commercial 
activities, are no longer matters of contention. 
       
Conclusion: Domestic Intermediaries of Change 
 
Reflecting a widely-shared view of the magnitude of the change involved, 
Bavaria’s Finance Minister has called the reform of Germany’s public law 
banking sector “a revolution.”
90  It is likely that the rump public service 
components of the Landesbanken will be substantially depoliticized.  Without 
the profits obtained from commercial activities, the Landesbanken may not be 
able to provide as extensive an array of public goods as they have in the past.  
Nonetheless, with the system of local and regional Sparkassen intact, the social 
market economy model endures, and is perhaps invigorated by the purging of 
the increasingly internationalized and commercial components of the large 
Landesbanken.
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But it is the dynamics of change emerging from the conflict between EC 
competition rules and Germany’s public sector banks that are especially 
interesting. The dramatic restructuring of Germany’s public sector banks, so 
deeply rooted in German political and economic development and intricately 
embedded in German federalism, would not have been possible without the 
emergence of the European level as an alternative arena of interest articulation 
and a supplementary regulatory mechanism.  At the same time, the application 
of European Community regulatory instruments was hardly mechanical.  The 
process was protracted and involved extensive bargaining both between the 
European and German levels and within the German political arena.   
 29
The application of Community competition law to Germany’s public 
sector banks was a product of two factors: the aggressive expansion of the 
business of the public sector banks into commercial activities, intensifying direct 
competition with the private sector; and enhanced opportunities for private 
sector actors – in this case the BdB, the association of Germany’s commercial 
banks – to challenge at the European level restraints on competition emerging 
from domestic institutional arrangements.  But even though the European 
Commission, charged with enforcing single market competition rules, found 
potential merit in the BdB complaint, it encouraged resolution through a 
domestic political process rather than a European one.  Had the threat of 
Community-level action been perceived as credible by those actors in the most 
powerful institutional and market positions  – particularly the Finance Ministry 
of Nordrhein Westfalen and top officials of the Westdeutsche Landesbank – a 
bargain might have emerged within the German political arena.  However, the 
domestic bargaining environment was highly asymmetrical, with Land 
governments and Landesbanken officials confident that the public law banking 
system was politically immunized against the application of EC competition 
rules and therefore facing few incentives to make concessions to the claims of 
the commercial banks.  Within the main political parties, national level leaders 
that might have preferred a domestic resolution to conflict with the European 
Commission were constrained by their political need to support the Länder and 
their own regional party leadership. 
 
Even after the process became “Europeanized,” involving the European 
Commission and the formal application of Community competition law, the 
dimensions of reform did not fully emerge until politically central actors in 
German politics began to recast their conceptions of the nature and role of the 
Landesbanken and Sparkassen in the political economy of the Federal Republic.  
In other words, the Commission's competition policy enforcement powers did 
not lead directly to a resolution of the conflict, which required a long process of 
negotiation with institutionally powerful actors.  Only in the second half of  
2001, nearly a decade after the original complaint by the private sector banks 
regarding the status of the public sector financial institutions, did Germany’s 
Land governments, Landesbank officials, the federal government, and the 
European Commission approach the terms of a solution that would bring the 
public law banking system into compliance with Community competition rules. 
 
“Europeanization” had two effects.   First, the pressures faced by the 
Landesbanken to resolve the incompatibility with EC competition rules were 
directly proportional to their involvement in international markets.  WestLB thus 
faced the most intense pressures, and became anxious to comprehensively 
resolve the EC competition policy cases pending against it.  Second, beginning 
from a conception of the Landesbanken and Sparkassen as tightly-knit 30
components of a unitary, inviolable public sector element of the social market 
economy, first federal-level leaders of the major political parties, then regional 
politicians, began to distinguish the Landesbanken from the Sparkassen, 
identifying the latter as the vital core of the public law banking system.  These 
elites had to redefine their understanding of the relationship between the public 
law banks and the social market economy.  In this sense, while the European 
single market was the driving force of change, those national party leaders who 
viewed the restructuring demanded from the European level  as consistent with 
the values of Germany’s social market economy served as intermediaries in the 
process of change.   
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